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  1Natural Amenities, Income Mix, and Endogenous Community Characteristics 
 
Introduction 
Substantial income variation is present across communities in the United States.  Some 
communities are inhabited largely by high-income households, others by those largely in poverty.  
For example, over 50% of households in Douglas County in Colorado had incomes above 
$75,000 in 2000, while more than 50% of households in Buffalo County, South Dakota were in 
poverty (Census Bureau 2000).  On the other hand, there exists significant variation in public 
services across communities.  Take public education as an example. Public education spending 
per capita is as high as $6,539 in Lake County in Colorado, but only $39 in Platte County in 
Suffolk City in Virginia, much lower than the national average $1,128.  Then, the question is 
what causes variations in income and public services across communities, and do these two 
variations affect each other?  To answer the above questions adequately, we need to understand 
how households with various incomes make location decisions. 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate how households distribute 
themselves across communities, and more generally how community characteristics serve to 
attract alternative income groups, and how these alternative income groups in turn have impacts 
on community characteristics, especially public services. The answers to these questions are 
important because income distribution directly affects a community’s economic base and vitality, 
and because understanding the attraction of community characteristics to alternative income 
groups is critical to local policy maker.  
  A number of studies have examined households’ location decisions.  In the public finance 
literature, Tiebout sorting has been traditionally the theoretical foundation of community 
  2selection.  The argument, first proposed by Tiebout(1956), is that households sort themselves 
across local jurisdiction according to their public good preferences.  Wealthier households value 
public services more than do poor households and hence more likely reside in communities with 
better public services.  Tiebout framework has been the basis for numerious economic and 
political science articles (Rhode and Strumpf 2003).  These studies, for example, include Epple, 
Filimon and Romer (1984), Epple and Romer (1991), Fernandez and Rogerson (1997), and 
Wooders (1999), among others. Some recent examples include Nechyba (1999;2000), who study 
education spending; Perroni and Scharf (2001), who analyze generic local public goods.   
  Several other theories have been advanced to explain why rich households make different 
location decision than poor households.  For instance, Schmidheiny (2002;2006) proposes that a 
progressivity of a local income tax as a new theoretical explanation for income segregation of the 
population; and Ross and Yinger (1999) in their literature survey suggest that property tax 
explains the income sorting. 
In the urban economic literature, the classic monocentric-city model, developed by 
Alonso-Mills-Muth, assumes that the income elasticity of housing demand is greater than the 
income elasticity of commuting cost, and thus, wealthier households tend to live in suburbs.  
However, the validity of the assumption is called into question by empirical evidence from 
Wheaton (1977).  
The other important factor affecting location decision by income group is the 
heterogeneity of amenities across jurisdictions.  Brueckner et al. (1999) suggest that even if the 
income elasticity of housing demand is identical to the income elasticity of commuting cost, 
income segregation is likely to occur if amenities are spatially heterogeneous across communities.    
Brueckner et al. use this amenity-based theory of residential location decisions to explain why 
  3high-income households in the urban United States tend to live in suburbs, but in the city center 
in Paris.  Wu and Cho (2002) study the income distribution and suggest that the ignorance of 
amenities would result in a biased estimate of preference parameters. Wu (2006) develops a 
theoretical model to analyze the residential location decisions and community’s characteristics 
and finds that socioeconomic characteristics of communities are heavily influenced by their 
environmental characteristics. 
  Compared to the rich literature on income segregation theories, there are much fewer 
empirical studies on income segregation.  In the limited empirical works, metropolitan areas are 
frequently the study areas.  Friedman (1981), Nechyba and Strauss (1998) study the location 
choice of households in San Francisco area and suburbs of Philadelphia, respectively, and find 
that public expenditures are an important locational factor.  Epple and Sieg (1999a), and Epple, 
et al. (2001) empirically model community choice as the result of sorting on public goods 
provision and housing prices in 92 communities in the Boston areas. Feld and Kirchgässner 
(2001) find that income tax rate has a negative impact on the share of rich households in Swiss 
cantons and main cities.  They use instrumental variables of lagged observations to solve the 
generic endogeneity of income tax rate, but this treatment may be insufficient to eliminate the 
endogeneity problem (2006).  Schmidheiny (2006) also study Switzerland and reaches the same 
results by assuming constant public goods across communities and controlling other segregation 
factors such as social interaction and distance from the central business district.  
Our study makes several contributions to literature.  First, different from previous studies 
which typically treat provisions of public goods as given, our study endogenizes provisions of 
public services which are determined by the location pattern of different income groups (Epple 
and Romer 1991;Epple and Sieg 1999a).  Second, we explicitly take into account environmental 
  4amenities which have been ignored in most previous studies, except Feld and Kirchgässner 
(2001), who use the ranks of three criteria ‘silence’, ‘landscape’ and ‘beauty of the locality’ of 
the survey of Swiss recruits to approximate the amenity level in the canton.  
 
The Model 
Assume there are three income groups, with  ,, ih m l = denoting high-, median, and low-income 
groups, respectively. Given certain community characteristics j Z in community j, households 
derive their utility, , from public services ( ), and environmental amenities ( ) and 
consumptions of private goods.  Public services such as public education represent the social 
amenities, and are determined endogenously by income mix in community j.  Environmental 
amenities are exogenously provided by geographic feature and vary across communities, but are 
homogenous within each community.  This assumption indicates households living in a 
community share the same environmental amenities, but households in different communities 
enjoy different amenities.  The utility function for income group i in community   is  
i U j g j a
j
 (1)        [,,, () ] ij j j j i i j UU g a Z y C g =−
 
where   is the available budget for consumptions of private goods, with  denoting 
household income,   the amount of tax that a household in income group  has to pay to 
finance the local public services, and  . Thus, income group i’s desired public 
services level   is  
() ii j yC g − i y
() ij Cg i
'( ) 0 ij Cg≥
*
j g
(2)                                                          
* [ , , , ( )], , , . ij j j j i i j ga r g m a x U g a Z y C g i l m =− h =
As in previous models of local jurisdiction (Epple and Romer 1991;Epple and Sieg 1999a), the 
public services level in a community is determined by majority vote of its residents. For example, 
  5if lower income household group is the dominant resident group, then by majority rule the level 
of public services preferred by low-income group is the level of the public service in that 
community. We define the level of public services decided by the majority rule in a community 
as 
*
Mj g .   Households’ indirect utility can be expressed as 
(3)                                            
** [, ; , ( ij ij Mj j j i i mj VU ga Z y C g =−
* ) ]
Given the exogenous income , household would reside in the community   if  obtained in 
the community is greater than the indirect utility obtained from any other communities. 
Because the household’s indirect utility is unobservable,  can be considered as a random 







(4)                                             
*
ij ij VX =β +ε
where  β is the parameter, X is a vector including the level of public services, natural amenities, 
and other exogenous community characteristics j Z in demography (DEMO), economics(ECON), 
geography (GEO), and politics (POL), and  ij ε is a random error term.  If the random error term is 
assumed to follow Weibull distribution, then the probability that the income group i live in the 
community   is given by Multinomial logit model (Maddala 1983)  j
















Because individual household data are not available, we use county level aggregate data, the 
share of alternative income groups ( ij P ), to approximate the .   Normalization of each share by 
the share of median income group ( ) yields  
ij p
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and the share of the reference group is  













The multinomial logit model has been widely used in farmer’s land allocation decisions 
(Wu and Segerson 1995), the choice of irrigation technology and alternative crop management 
practices (Caswell and Zilberman 1985;Wu and Babcock 1998).   
Marginal effects of changes of explanatory variables on the share of alternative income 
group in a community are nonlinear combinations of the explanatory variables and can be written 
as (Greene) 
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 where  k x is a specific community characteristic k ,  ˆ
ik β is the estimated coefficient of  k x ( ˆ
ik β =0 
when  ), and  im = ˆi p is the estimated share of households in income group i . The sign 
and magnitude of this marginal effect have no direct relationship with any specific coefficient. 
(, il h = )
  Empirically, the following logarithmic transformations are used to estimate   ˆ
is β
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  7The vector of community characteristics, j X , is exogenous, except the community pubic 
service,
*
Mj g , which is endogenously defined by equation (2).  We assume that takes linear 
functional form as follows 
*
mj g
(11)                                                    
*
Mjj gW M j = γ+ ε , 
where  includes not only environmental amenity, variables in  j W j Z (DEMO, ECON, GEO, and 
POL), but also local property tax, and shares of low- and high- income group in community j. 
Local property tax is included because local public services in U.S. are mainly funded by local 
property tax revenues.  One objective of this study is to examine the effect of income mix on the 
provision of public goods, thus, shares of alternative income group are included in equation 
(11).
1  Equation(9), (10), and (11) form the simultaneous equation system of our empirical study.  
The equation system is estimated using the county level data.  County is the smallest 
geographic unit that most economic data are available, and also county is the basic political unit 
that local government fulfills its administrative duty such as providing local public service.  
Since county-level data are cross-sectional and a random shock in a county may affect 
neighboring counties as well, potential spatial autocorrelation exists.  Not correcting spatial 
dependence can result in misspecifiation, which further leads to biased and inconsistent  OLS 
estimate (Anselin 1988;Anselin 1988).  Given this, the system is estimated using generalized 
spatial three-stage least square estimator (GS3SLS) developed by Kalijian and Prucha (2004).  
At first step, two-stage least square estimator is used to estimate equation (9), (10), and (11).  At 
the second step, Moran’s I test is used to test if spatial autocorrelation exists for each equation 
using residuals from the first step.  If spatial autocorrelation is identified, then spatial 
autocorrelation parameter   is estimated using equation (7) in Kelejan and Prucha (1999).  We  ρ
                                                 
1 To avoid perfect colinearity, only shares of low- and high- income group are included. 
  8assume in this study the spatial dependence operates through the error termε and follow the 
structure  , ε=ρϖε+µ
2 whereϖ is the spatial weight matrix created based on the geographic 
adjacency rule,
3 and   has a  distribution.  Using the estimated ,  is used 
to adjust the original data to correct the spatial autocorrelation.  Finally, after correcting the 
endogeneity and spatial autocorrelation, at the third step, Lagrange Multiplier statistic (
µ
2 (0, ) n NI σ ˆ ρ
1 ˆ () I
− −ρϖ
LM λ ) is 
used to test whether cross-equation correlation exists or not (Greene 2003).
4  If cross-equation 
correlation is identified, then seemingly unrelated estimator (SUR) is applied to correct the 
contemporaneous correlation. 
 
Data and Variable Description  
The objective of this study is to investigate the interaction between community 
characteristics and income segregation.  Data on community characteristics and income 
segregation are required to conduct our empirical study, which covers 2992 counties in lower 48 
states. Our data come from a range of sources including Census of Bureau (2000), Economic 
Research Service (ERS), Census of Government (1997), Natural Resource Inventory (NRI 1997) 
and USA Today.  Table 1 lists variable descriptions and statistics.  
 
Dependent Variables 
                                                 
2 The other type of spatial dependence is called spatial lagged dependence, which is operated through the lagged 
term of dependent variables.  
3 Two criteria are usually used to create spatial weight. One is contiguity-based spatial weight and the other is 
distance-based spatial weight. The contiguity-based spatial weight usually uses two criteria: rook contiguity, which 
uses common boundaries to define neighbors, and the queen contiguity which uses common points (boundaries and 
vertices) in the definition. Distance-based spatial weight defines the neighbors according to the specified distance, or 
the specified k-nearest neighbors.  The spatial weight matrix can be created in a variety of softwares such as 
Arcview 3.2, ArcGIS 9.0, SpaceStat, and Geoda.  
4 LM statistic has a limiting chi-squared distribution with M(M-1)/2 degree of freedom, where M is the number of 
equations in the simultaneous system. For details about the Lagrange Multiplier statistic, please check page 350 in 
Green (5
th edition, 2003). 
  9As mentioned above, households are grouped into three categories: low-, median-, and 
high income groups.  Income distribution data are from Census Bureau 2000 Summary File 3 
(SF3), which represents measurements of variables in 1999.  The summary file provides a rich 
set of information on population and housing at the county level.  Particularly, SF 3 reports the 
number of households in the 16 income categories.  
Low income household is defined according to the poverty definition set by the Census 
Bureau.  Households are low income households (or under poverty) if their family pre-tax money 
income in a given year is below the poverty threshold for their family size and age composition. 
The 1999 average poverty threshold for a family of four persons was $17,092.  Poverty 
thresholds were applied on a national basis and were not adjusted for regional, state or local 
variations in the cost of living.   In 1999, the national average poverty rate is about 14%. 
High-income households are defined as the households whose pre-tax income is above 
$75,000.  This definition is following Mallett (2001) who defined household of members over 5 
with annual income above $75,000 in 1995 as high income household.  In 1999, the national 
average household size is 2.26, and the maximum county average household size is 4.48, lower 
than 5.  Consequently, taking into account household size and cost of living in 1999, $75,000 is a 
reasonable threshold to defined high income households.  The share of high income household is 
the ratio of total high income households to total households in a community. The mean of share 
of high income households is about 12% at national average, in 1999. The maximum share of 
high income is as high as 55%, and the minimum is only about 1.5%, an indication of dramatic 
variation in income across communities.  
Median income households are difference between the total households and sum of low 
and high income households in a community.  Median income group is a rough concept, because 
  10it consists of households with income both lower and higher than mean income, $36,222 in 1999.  
The mean of share of median income is about 74%.  
Community pubic services are one of important community characteristics affecting 
income segregation, and are multidimensional (education, public safety, public welfare, etc.).  
Since the level of public services is not directly observed and there is no officially available 
index to measure the quality and quantity of public services, we have to rely on proxy variables.  
As previous studies (Epple and Sieg 1999b;Bergstrom and Goodman 1973;Borcherding and 
Deacon 1972),  we approximate the quantity of community public services by dollars of local 
direct general expenditure per capita.  The direct general expenditure mainly consists of spending 
in education, social service, transportation, public safety, environment and housing, government 
administration, and interest on general debt.   The local government finances data at county level 
are from Census of Governments and for the year 1997.  It would be ideal to use local 
government finance data for the year 1999, but such data are not available since a Census of 
Governments is taken at 5-year intervals as required b law under Title 13, United State Code, 
Section 161. The mean of local direct general spending per capita in 1999 is $2,506.  
Alternatively, public education is taken as a proxy of local public service quality not only 
because local spending on education is the largest category of local expenditure, but also public 
education is likely the central concern in locational choices of most households.  According to 
Census of Government, education includes local government-operated elementary and secondary 
schools, and any universities, colleges, junior, or community colleges operated by the local 
government.  Ideally, a measure of average test scores in the community would be a good proxy 
of education quality in the community.  However, these types of measurements are not available 
at county-level.  Hence, following Alesina et al. (1999), and Nechyba and Strauss (1998), we use 
  11local expenditure on education per capita to approximate local education quality.  One of the 
limitations of such a measurement in the literature is that increasing expenditure on education 
does not necessarily translate into greater student achievement.  The education expenditure is 
also collected from the Census of Governments 1997.  The mean of education spending per 
capita is about $1,128 in 1997, and the minimum and maximum are roughly $40 and $6, 539, 
respectively.   
 
Explanatory Variables 
As stated in theoretical model, household location decision is affected by natural 
amenities and other community characteristics j Z , which consists of demographic, economic, 
geographic, and political variables. 
Natural amenity is an attribute that enhance a location as a place to live, thereby it affects 
a household’s location decision.  We draw on amenity index developed by Economic Research 
Service (ERS) to measure the natural amenity.  The ERS amenity index is created to capture the 
physical rather than social or economic environment, thus, man-made amenities such as 
historical building, golf courses, and casino are excluded.  Six measures are selected to reflect 
the physical beauty of a location in terms of climate, topography and water area. They are warm 
winter (average January temperature), winter sun (average January days of sun), temperate 
summer (low winter-summer temperature gap), summer humidity (low average July humidity), 
topographic variation (topography scale), and water area (water area as proportion of total county 
area).  The greater the index, the higher amenity level is in a community.  More details about the 
amenity index is available in ERS web site.  
  12Demographic composition in a county is likely to affect the income segregation and the 
demand for public goods as well.  In this study, education, age composition, household structure, 
and local housing tenure are used to measure the demographic composition.  Education 
attainment affects income and demand for public goods directly.  We use the percent of 
population 25-year old and over with college and above degree as a proxy of the education 
attainment in a county.   
Age not only affects one’s income, but more importantly age structure is a determinant of 
preference for public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999).  In this study, share of 
population older than 65 is used to estimate the effect of age composition on income mix and 
demand for public goods.  The elder may depend more on retirement pension and public welfare 
program as income source. Thus, community having high percent of old people is more likely to 
have high share of low income group.  On the public service size, the life cycle hypothesis would 
predict that persons over 65 years of age tend to spend a large portion of their current income on 
current consumption than younger people, thus they may demand more public services than 
younger people, but different types of public goods.  Poterba (1997) finds that the larger the 
share of elderly in a jurisdiction is, the lower the public spending on education is.  However, the 
elder prefer aging-related public service such as public health, medical care, and senior 
recreation service.  
Household structure is measured by percent of households headed by women.  The 
reason why female-headed household is taken into account is because female family heads are 
usually disproportionately young, lesser educated and less skilled, female-headed family is more 
likely to live under poverty (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). 
  13Housing tenure is measured by the percent of housing occupied by owners.  It is believe 
that renters have different tastes in public goods from the remainder of the population, because 
renters do not believe that they pay the entire property tax on their housing, and tend to vote for 
more public expenditures than home-owners with the same income (Bergstrom and Goodman 
1973;Bergstrom and Goodman 1973).  Therefore, it is expected that high percent of owner 
occupied is negatively associated with public services.  Also, it is anticipated that the share of 
owner occupied is positively relate to the share of high income group, but negatively related to 
low income group because wealthier households tend to buy house rather than rent houses as low 
income households usually do.  
Economic situation in a community directly affect the employment opportunity of 
households, and the public services as well.   Economic situation is approximated by local labor 
market.  Previous studies have used variables such as employment rate, job growth rate, 
industrial composition, and occupational structure.
5  In our study, employment rate is used as the 
measurement of local labor market.  It is expected that community with high value of this 
variable would tend to have large share of high income group but small share of low income 
group, and a large amount of commercial and industrial activities.  As a result, it may be that 
larger amounts of public services must be provided in order to attract and retain such activities 
(Bergstrom and Goodman 1973).  However, the types of public services needed for commercial 
and industrial sectors may vary from residential need.  For example, residents may put heavy 
weight on education quality in the community, while commercial and industrial activities may 
put emphasis on public safety and transportation service.  Data of employment rate is obtained 
from US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
                                                 
5 However, as Weber (2005) states “each of these variables captures some aspects of local labor conditions that may 
affect poverty, but none is without flaws.” 
  14Community public services are funded largely through property tax revenues in U.S., 
which are raised mainly from tax on real property (building and lands) with the remainder 
derived from personal property tax.  However, county-level property tax data are not directly 
available.  Instead, we calculate the ratio of county property tax revenue to the population in a 
community as a proxy of property tax per capita.  It is expected that public service is positively 
related to property tax.  County property tax revenue data are also from Census of Government 
1997.  
Urban Influence Codes 1993 (UIC) from Economic Research Service is taken as the 
measurement of geographic adjacency to a metropolitan area. Since adjacency to a metropolitan 
is an important factor determining the location decision of a household.  UIC divide counties into 
9 categories, with 1 representing a metropolitan, 9 representing a remote area not adjacent to any 
metropolitan and town.  It is expected that location close to a metropolitan area is positively 
associated with high income group, but negatively with low income group.  
Political factors can affect the income mix and provision of public goods. Political 
competitiveness in a county is utilized to measure the political leadership’s commitment to 
economic development and political issue.  We construct political competitiveness variable 
based on the method developed by Levitt and Poterba (1999).  The variable is created as the 
differences in the number of votes for the democratic presidential candidate Gore between 
county and national average in 2000.  Counties with vote outcomes equal to the national average 
are more highly competitive politically.  Positive and negative values of this variable reflect that 
the county is democratic or conservative, respectively. 
 
Results 
  15Equations (9)-(11) are estimated for the two proxies of public services, local direct general 
expenditure per capita and public education spending per capita separately.  For convenience, the 
simultaneous equation system with the measurement of local direct general expenditure per 
capita is named Model 1, and the one of public education spending per capita Model 2.  Test of 
spatial autocorrelation is conducted for both models.  In model 1, spatial autocorrelations are 
identified for equation (9) and (10) but not for equation (11), and the estimated spatial 
autocorrelation parameters are 0.227 and 0.162, both of which are statistically significant at 1% 
level.  In model 2, spatial autocorrelations are identified and statistically significant at 1% level 
for all three equations(9)-(11).  The estimated spatial autocorrelation parameters are 0.242, 0.157, 
and 0.079, respectively.  The highly significant spatial parameters suggest that a random shock 
that affects the income segregation and public services level in a particular county triggers a 
change not only in that county but also in its neighboring counties.  In addition, LM test rejects 
the hypothesis that no cross-equation correlation exists across three equations.  Consequently, the 
simultaneous equation system is estimated by GS3SLS.  Results show that the data fit models 
quite well, since the system weighted R-Square for Model 1 and 2 are 68.14% and 67.88%, 
respectively.  Most coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level.  Estimated results are 
reported in Table 2 and 3 with standard deviation in the parenthesis for both models.   
Because each independent variable has a nonlinear effect on the range of the dependent 
variable in equation (9) and (10), it is difficult to interpret the effect directly.  Instead, marginal 
effect is calculated using equation (8) to evaluate the effect of unit change of each independent 
variable on the probability of change in the share of alternative income groups.  Table 4 reports 
marginal effects of explanatory variables in model 1 and 2, with elasticity in the parentheses. 
  16  Marginal effect of public services, measured by the local direct general expenditure and 
public education per capita, is negative with respect to the proportion of low-income households, 
but positive with respect to the share of median- and high- income groups in both models.  In 
model 1 and 2, a 1% increase in public service is associated with 0.26% and 0.24% reduction in 
the share of low-income group, but 0.28% and 0.18% rise in the proportion of high-income 
group. This result supports the argument that public services are a determinant of income 
segregation because middle and upper class households value public services more than the poor.  
Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) obtain the similar result using ranks of education, medical services 
and pubic traffic as the proxy of public services.  
Marginal effect of natural amenity in the share of high income group is positive, 
indicating high income households prefer location with better natural amenities.  Surprisingly, 
marginal effect of natural amenity in the share of low income group is also positive.  The 
possible explanation is that low income households prefer low living cost location, usually the 
rural areas, where natural amenity index is high because natural amenity index reflect amenity in 
climate, topography and water.  However, the magnitude of marginal effects in the share of 
alternative income groups is quite small, so is the elasticity.   
Educational attainment, measured as the percent of population with bachelors and above 
degrees, increases the proportion of high-income group, while reduce the share of median and 
low income groups.  Marginal effect is statistically significant at 1% level.  1% increases in the 
percent of population with college and above degree increase the share of high income group by 
0.54% and 0.65% in model 1 and 2, and cause a reduction in the share of low-income group by 
0.22% and 0.26%.  This result is consistent with other empirical evidences (Levernier, Partridge, 
and Rickman 2000;Rupasingha and Goetz 2003), which suggest that increasing educational 
  17attainment is effective in reducing poverty rate. Consistent with other empirical evidences in the 
literature in poverty that improved technical skill effectively removes people out of poverty.   
  Marginal effect of employment rate is negatively and significantly related to the share of 
low income households.  A 1% increase in the employment rate decreases the share of low-
income group by 0.57%.  This indicates that job accessibility plays a key role in poverty 
reduction.  In contrast, communities with high employment rate tend to have more median and 
high income households.  A 1% increase in employment rate cause a rise in the shares of 
median- and high-income group by 0.12% and 0.21% in model 1, and 0.13% and 0.16% in 
model 2.   
Household structure, approximated by the percent of female-headed households, has a 
positive and significant effect on the share of low income group, but negative and significant 
effect on the proportion of median and high-income groups.  This finding supports the 
convention that female-headed households tend to have higher poverty rate across all racial 
groups (Blank and Hanratty 1992), because female heads, as stated by Levernier et al. (2000), 
are usually the sole wage earner for the family, and disproportionately young, less educated, and 
less skilled.  Marginal effect of female-headed households on the share of low-income group is 
the largest among all explanatory variables in both models.  A 1% rise in the female-headed 
households causes about 1.1% increase in the share of low-income households, a finding similar 
to previous studies (Weinberg 1987;Lichter and Mclaughlin 1995).  Conversely, a 1% rise in 
female-headed households decreases the share of middle- and high-income group by over 0.11% 
and 0.55% in both models, respectively.  
The housing tenure, measured by the percent of owner occupied housing, affects the 
share of low- and median income group negatively, but the share of high-income group 
  18positively in both models.  This result is expected because median- and low-income households 
are more likely to rent a place rather than purchasing a house as the high income households do, 
communities with higher percent of owner occupied houses tend to have less median and low 
income households, but more high income households.  A 1% increases in the percent of owner 
occupied housing cause over 1.50% reduction in the share of low income households, but over 
2.0% rise in the share of high income households.  
The percent of aged 65 or older has negative effect on both high and low income group, 
but positive effect on the fraction of median income group.  It is expected that the marginal effect 
of the elder in the share of high income group is negative because the elder mainly rely on 
retirement pension or social security as their financial support. A 1% increase in the elder results 
in over 0.34% reduction in the proportion of high income households in a community in both 
models.  A 1% increase in the share of the aged is associated with about 0.20% decrease in the 
proportion of low-income group.  Traditional poverty literature often suggests that the elder are 
more likely to live under poverty.  However, recent several empirical evidences (Levernier, 
Partridge, and Rickman 2000) reach similar results.  Lichter and MaLaughlin (1995) find that the 
increase in the elderly population is the strongest predictors of declines in county poverty rate, 1 
percent increase in the elderly population leading to 0.32 percent reduction in county poverty 
between 1980 and 1990.  
The marginal effect of Urban Influence Codes (UIC) is positive regarding to the 
proportion of low and median income groups, but positive regarding to the share of high income 
group. A 1% increase in the UIC results in about 0.27% rise in the share of low income group, 
but a 0.43% reduction in the share of high income groups in both models.  UIC not only 
represent adjacency to a metropolitan, but also may implicitly reflect other two types of 
  19amenities- historical and modern amenities such as museum, restaurants, and theaters.  Hence, 
low income households tend to live far away from metropolitan area to avoid high living cost, 
but high income households prefer communities close to a metropolitan, where historical and 
modern amenities are better.  This finding is consistent with Brueckner et al. (1999) who find 
that the wealthy live in the central Paris because of rich historical and modern amenities there, 
while the poor live in suburb.    
Marginal effect of political factor in the share of low income group is negative, but 
positive with respect to the share of median and high income group.  But both effects are not 
statistically significant.   
    
Effects of Income Mix on Public Services   
Our empirical evidence shows that public services indeed are a factor that influences income mix.  
The share of low income household is negatively associated with public services in terms of 
local direct general expenditure and public education.  A 1% increase in the share of low income 
group in a community is associated with 0.46% and 0.23% decrease in local direct public 
expenditure and public education spending, respectively.  This finding is not surprised because 
public services are funded mainly through property tax and low-income households usually 
inhabit in low value housing, property tax revenue is low in communities with a high share of 
low-income households.  In contrast, public services are positively associated with the share of 
high-income households.  A 1% increase in the share of high-income group in a community 
results in a 0.05% and 0.12% increase in general public expenditure and public education 
spending, respectively.  This reveals that local public education expenditures are more 
responsive to the local income level than other types of public services.  It is hard to state which 
  20is the cause and which is the consequence.  However, the interaction between the income mix 
and public services is worth attention from local policy makers.  
Property tax is positively related to public service, and the marginal effects are 
statistically significant in both models.  This is expected because public services are funded 
primarily by local property tax.  Natural amenity is positively associated with public services. 
This indicates that location with better natural amenity tends to have better public services as 
well, because natural amenity enhances a place as a residence and households may be willing to 
pay more to live in a community with better natural amenity.  
Educational attainment is negatively related to public services in both models.  This result 
is unexpected because communities with more educated residents tend to demand better public 
education and other public services.   
The effect of employment rate has positive and statistically significant effect on local 
direct public service, but negative and statistically significant effect on public education.  A 10% 
increase in employment rate in a community results in 1% increase in general public expenditure, 
but a 1.3% decrease in public education.  This implies that the increased commercial and 
industry activities from higher employment rate demand more public services such as public 
transportation and safety to support such activities.  
Female-headed households are positively related with public services in both models.  A 
1% increase in the percent of female-headed households leads to a 0.88% and 0.41% increase in 
model 1 and 2, respectively.  The reason is that female-headed households are usually single 
mother, and more likely to rely on public welfare, thereby community with high percent of 
female-headed household tend to have high expenditure in public service.  
  21The percent of owner occupied housing is negatively associated with public services in 
both models.  This result is consistent with (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973) and supports the 
hypothesis that renters tend to vote for more public expenditure than homeowners with same 
income.  
As discussed, the elderly may have different demands for public services in terms of the 
quantities and types.  As expected, the percent of the aged is negatively associated with public 
education, a 10% increase in the percent of the elder lead to 1 percent decrease in public 
education expenditure.  Although life cycle hypothesis suggests that the elderly may spend more 
on public services especially aging-related public goods, our results show that the higher the 
share of the elderly in a community, the lower the local direct general expenditure is.  The reason 
may be that despite the elderly may demand more for aging-related public services such as 
public welfare, the effect on general public services is washed out by their less demands for other 
public services, particularly the public education.  
Urban Influence Codes (UIC) is negatively related to public services.   Large value of 
UIC implies that community is far away from a metropolitan area.  There are fewer population 
reside in the remote area, thereby the spending on public services per capita is larger in the 
remote area. This may reflect that there is an economics of scale in the provision of public 
services. 
The effect of political factor on public service is positive with respect to the local direct 
public service, but negative with respect to the public education.  However, both effects are not 
statistically significant.  The marginal effect of the size of a county on the public services is 
positive and statistically significant.  
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This study concentrates on the question how community characteristics explain the income mix.  
Specifically, we are interested in the relationship between income mix and local public services.  
Our results show that income mix indeed interacts with the local public services in the 
communities.  Public services are measured by both the local direct general expenditure and 
public education per capita in our study.  The finding suggests that a 1% increase in public 
education expenditure is associated with a 0.26% decrease in the share of low-income household 
in a county, but it is associated with 0.28% increase in the share of high-income households. 
Likewise, a 1% increase in the share of low-income group is associated with a 0.46% decrease in 
the general public expenditure and a 0.23% decrease in public education expenditure, while a 1% 
increase in the share of high-income households is associated with a 0.05% increase in general 
public expenditure and a 0.12% increase in public education expenditure. Communities with 
better natural amenities, higher education attainment, and higher share of owner occupied 
housing, and higher employment rates tend to have more high-income households.   
Communities far away from the metropolitan and with more female-headed households tend to 
have more low-income households.   
Our results also have important policy implication, particularly in the poverty reduction.  
The results show that higher educational attainment is associated with lower poverty rate. This 
suggests that increasing education is effective in poverty reduction.  Policies that increase labor 
force participation are effective in alleviating poverty as well.  This is particularly true to life low 
income households out of poverty.  Our findings reveal that the familial status of women is 
strongly associated with poverty.  Consequently, it is important for policy makers to develop 
local economic strategies that promote the entry of women into labor market.  
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  26Table 1, Variable Description and Statistics 
 
Variable Description  Mean  Std  Dev  Min  Max 
Low  Share of low income household 
(%) 
0.14 0.06  0.02  0.48
Median  Share of median income 
household (%) 
0.74 0.06  0.43  0.90
High  Share of high income household 
(%) 
0.12 0.07  0.02  0.55
School  Public expenditure on local 
education ( thousand $/per capita) 
1.13 0.36  0.40  6.54
Public  General public expenditure 
( thousand $/ per capita) 
2.51 1.10  0.18 21.41
Tax  Local property tax ($/per capita)  0.63  0.50  0.03  10.50
Amenity  ERS amenity index  0.04  2.29  -6.40  11.17
College Percent  of  population 25+ with 
college or higher degree (%) 
0.10 0.04  0.03  0.39
Old  Percent of population 65+ (%)  0.15  0.04  0.02  0.35
Fehu  Percent of female-headed 
household (%) 
0.22 0.05  0.04  0.43
UIC  ERS urban influence code  5.56  2.73  1.00  9.00
Size  Total areas of a county (thousand 
acres) 
 630.56   836.88    28.60  12868.20
Political  Political competition   0.09  0.07     0.00  0.45
Emprate Employment  rate  0.46  0.07  0.14  0.89
Occupied   Percent of owner-specified 
occupied houses (%) 
0.85 0.09  0.23  0.98
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Sli     -8.184* 
(0.796) 
Shi     1.106 
(1.946) 





























































ρ  0.227* 0.162*   
System Weighted R-Square: 68.14%;  234 LM λ =  
* significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and ***at 10% 
 
 
  28Table 3, GS3SLS Results for Model 2 







Sli     -1.843* 
(0.262) 
Shi     1.100*** 
(0.644) 





























































ρ  0.242* 0.157* 0.079* 
System Weighted R-Square: 67.88%;  262 LM λ =  
* significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and ***at 10% 
  29Table 4, Results of Marginal Effect and Elasticity of Explanatory Variables 
Marginal Effect for Model 1  Marginal Effect for Model 2  Variables 

























































































































* significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and ***at 10% 
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